Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1989

State of Utah v. Eli Patrick Archuletta: Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James L. Shumate; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; David B. Thompson; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Respondent.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Eli Patrick Archuletta, No. 890168 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1989).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/1701

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF
UTAH
DOCUMENT
KFU
50
.A10
QlOIko
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
DOCKET NO.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 890168-CA

Classification Priority 2

ELI PATRICK ARCHULETTA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a Judgment, Conviction, and Sentence on a
Second-Degree Felony of attempted aggravated arson and a
Third-Degree Felony of injury to a jail following a jury trial in
the Fifth District Court for Iron County, State of Utah, the
Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

JAMES L. SHUMATE
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
110 North Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-3772
PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

AUG

C\ 10 r

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 890168-CA

ELI PATRICK ARCHULETTA,

Classification Priority 2

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a Judgment, Conviction, and Sentence on a
Second-Degree Felony of attempted aggravated arson and a
Third-Degree Felony of injury to a jail following a jury trial in
the Fifth District Court for Iron County, State of Utah, the
Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding.

JAMES L. SHUMATE
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
110 North Main, Suite H
P.O. Box 623
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801) 586-3772
PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
23 6 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

TABLE OF CONTENTS
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

1

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

1

NATURE OF THE CASE

2

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

2

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY OF
ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED ARSON IN ADDITION TO THE
INJURY TO A JAIL OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS
CONVICTED

4

CONCLUSION

6

ADDENDUM

7

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
State v. Breckenridcre, 688 P.2d 400 (Utah, 1984)

. 4

State v. Webb, 113 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, (Utah, Supreme Court
July 21, 1989) .

. ,

,

,

,

. 5

STATUTES AND RULES
76-6-101, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended * . . . * * .

1

76-6-102, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended . *

1

76-6-103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended

, ...

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 890168-CA
vs.
ELI PATRICK ARCHULETTA,
Defendant-Appellant.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is established
by 78-2a-3(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a Judgment, Conviction, and
Sentence following a jury trial in which the Defendant-Appellant
was convicted
Felony

and

of attempted aggravated arson, a Second-Degree

injury

to

a

jail,

a

Third-Degree

Felony.

The

Defendant-Appellant•s conviction -of a Thirds-Degree Felony, injury
to a jail is not being contested.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Was there sufficient evidence to convict the Defendant
of attempted arson, or should the allegations leading to arson
relate solely to the injury to a jail?
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, OR BULES.
The statut .e which is believed to be determinative in
this matter is 76-6-101, 76-6-102, and 76-6-103,

Utah Code

Annotated, 1953, as amended.

This statute are reproduced in

total as the addendum to this brief.
NATURE OF THE CASE
This

is an

appeal

from

a Judgment, Sentence, and

Commitment from the Fifth Judicial Court of Iron County, State of
Utah, following a jury trial in which the Defendant was convicted
of a Second-Degree Felony on the offense of attempted aggravated
arson and a Third-Degree Felony offense of injury to a jail.

The

Defendant was sentenced to serve a single sentence of one to
fifteen years on the attempted aggravated arson charge.

The

sentencing on the injury to a jail charge was stayed.
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Trial in this matter was held in the District Court of
Iron County, State of Utah, on December 7, 1988.

Following the

Defendant's conviction, a pre-sentence report was prepared and
the Defendant was sentenced to a single term of one to fifteen
years on the Second-Degree Felony conviction.

The trial court

stayed the imposition of sentence on the Third-Degree Felony
conviction of injury to a jail.

The Defendant had earlier been

coimitted as an inmate to the Utah State Prison, and he is
presently serving his previous sentence, with the sentence in
this matter to be served consecutively following the previous
sentence.

2

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
The Defendant was sentenced to serve one to fifteen
years at the Utah State Prison on the Second-Degree

Felony

offense of attempted aggravated arson to run consecutively with
the previous sentences that he was serving.
STATEMENT OF "FACTS
On May 31, 1988, the Defendant was housed in the State
Prisoner

section

of the

Iron

County/Utah

State

Facility located in Cedar City, Utah. (T.33-34)

Correctional
The Defendant

was a prisoner in the custody of the Utah State Division of
Corrections

and was previously

Prison- (T.26)

On

May

31,

committed
1988,

the

to

the Utah

Defendant

had

State
been

threatened by other inmates in the facility (T.123-124) and had
requested that the facility's personnel move him to a more secure
location within the facility. (T.125)
denied that request. (T.125)

The facility personnel

When making a check of the facility

late that evening, two correctional

officers

found a window

broken out of the steel door leading to the Defendant's cell
(T.71) and observed the Defendant inside his cell with a lighted
match near a pile of papers stacked in the corner of the bed
within the cell. (T.72)

The mattress on the steel bunk had been

pulled back so that the papers were resting on the steel bunk in
the corner against a painted cinder block wall.- (T.53-54)

The

Defendant then lit the papers with the match causing a fire in
the corner of th§ cell. (T.72)

Other damage had been done to the

cell in that a water faucet had been broken off a fixture in the
3

cell and the window had been broken out. (T.128)
mirrors within the cell had also been dented.

The metcil

The testimony

relating to the fire damages is found on pages 103 and 104 of the
trial transcript.

Mr. Lyle Glover, custodial for the facility,

stated, "Fire damage on the paint—to the paint.
started

the

fire on

the bunk

and

burned

a

Where he has
corner

of

the

cell." (T.103-104)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
There

was

insufficient

evidence

to

support

the

conviction of attempted aggravated arson, a Second-Degree Felony,
for the reason that the Defendant's action of lighting a fire on
a steel bunk against a painted cinder block wall was not conduct
sufficient to support the kind of damage required under the arson
statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICTION OF A SECOND-DEGREE FELONY OF ATTEMPTED AGGRAVATED
ARSON IN ADDITION TO THE INJURY TO A JAIL OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT
WAS CONVICTED.
In order to convict the Defendant of attempted aggravated
arson, the State of Utah was required to have shown that the
Defendant

attempted by means of fire to damage a habitable

structure, ie. the Iron County/Utah State Correctional Facility.
Pursuant to the holding in State v. Breckenridge, 688 P. 2d 400
(Utah, 1984) the State was required to show that the Defendant
attempted to intentionally damage the property of another, in
this case being the Correctional Facility.
4

The evidence in the

case shows that the fire was lit on a steel bunk against a
painted
ceiling.

cinder

block

wall

which

was

supporting

a

concrete

Upon the provisions of 76-2-304 ignorance or mistake of

fact which disproves the- culpable mental state is a defense to
any prosecution for a crime.

It is the Defendant-Appellant's

position that the mistake of fact, if there was any such mistake,
would be at that the steel bunk, the block wall, and the ceiling
were in fact flammable.

It is this Appellant's assertion that

the evidence in this case is not sufficient at a matter of law to
support a conviction of attempted aggravated arson.

The burning

of paint affixed to a steel bunk, a cinder block wall, or a
concrete

ceiling

does

not

constitute

the

type

of

"damage"

required under 76-6-103, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.
It is the Appellant's position that he did not mistake the fact
that the bunk, wall, and ceiling were not flammable but that the
fire was lit in order- to be -a contained -blaze -because of its
location in the corner of the steel bunk after the mattress had
been rolled back.
The

Defendant

respectfully

requests

this

Court

to

overturn his conviction of attempted aggravated arson and to
dismiss that count in the information.
Since the Defendant has been tried, and since the
evidence is wholly insufficient as as matter of law to
support a conviction, if follows that the information
must be dismissed and the defendant discharged. Double
jeopardy bars the retrial of a defendant when an
appellant
court
declares
the
evidence
to
be
insufficient to sustain a conviction. State v. Webb
113 Utah Adv, Rep. 23, (Utah .. Supreme ~ Court July
21,1989).
5

CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above, the Defendant requests that
the conviction of attempted aggravated arson be reversed and that
that count of the information be dismissed.
/>

DATED this

L

7

day of August, 1989.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the above and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to Mr, Paul Van
Dam, Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this
postage fully prepaid.

7

day of August, 1989, first class
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CHAPTER 6
3 F F E N S E S AGAINST PROPERTY
•perty destruction.
rglary and criminal trespass.
;>bery.
3ft.
lud.
tail theft,
mputer crimes.
>rary theft.
PART 1
PROPERTY
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.

DESTRUCTION

Definitions.
Arson.
Aggravated arson.
Reckless burning.
Causing a catastrophe.
Criminal mischief.

01. Definitions.
purposes of this chapter:
(1) "Property" means any form of real property
r tangible personal property which is capable of
eing damaged or destroyed and includes a habitble structure.
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building,
ehicle, trailer, railway car, aircraft, or waterraft used for lodging or assembling persons or
onducting business whether a person is actually
resent or not.
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone
ther than the actor has a possessory or propritary interest in any portion thereof.
(4) "Value" means:
(a) The market value of the property, if
totally destroyed, at the time and place of
the offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the market value; or
(b) Where the market value cannot he ascertained, the cost of repairing or replacing
the property within a reasonable time following the offense.
(c) If the property damaged has a value
that cannot be ascertained by the criteria set
forth in Subsections (a) and (b) above, the
property shall be deemed to have a value not
to exceed $50.
1974
-102. A r s o n .
) A person is guilty of arson if, under circumces not amounting to aggravated arson, by means
re or explosives, he unlawfully and intentionally
ages:
(a) any property with intention of defrauding
an insurer; or
(b) the property of another.
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(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the
second degree. A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a
felony of the second degree if the damage caused exceeds $5,000 value; a class A misdemeanor if the
damage exceeds $1,000 but is not more than $5,000
value; a class B misdemeanor if the damage caused
exceeds $250 but is not more than $1,000 value; any
other violation is a class C misdemeanor.
1986
76-6-103. A g g r a v a t e d a r s o n .
( D A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by
means of fire or explosives he intentionally and unlawfully damages:
(a) a habitable structure; or
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person
not a participant in the offense is in the structure
or vehicle.
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree.
1986

76-6-104. R e c k l e s s b u r n i n g .
( D A person is guilty of reckless burning if he:
(a) Recklessly starts a fire or causes an explosion which endangers human life; or
(b) Having started a fire, whether recklessly
or not, and knowing that it is spreading and will
endanger the life or property of another, either
fails to take reasonable measures to put out or
control the fire or fails to give a prompt fire
alarm; or
(c) Damages the property of another by reckless use of fire or causing an explosion.
(2) A violation of Subsections (a) and (b) is a class
A misdemeanor. A violation of Subsection (c) is a
class A misdemeanor if damage to property exceeds
$1,000 value; a class B misdemeanor if the damage to
property exceeds $500 value; and a class C misdemeanor if the damage to property exceeds $50 value.
Any other violation under Subsection (c) shall constitute an infraction.
1973
76-6-105. C a u s i n g a catastrophe.
(1) Any person who by explosion, fire, flood, avalanche, collapse of a building, release of poison gas,
radioactive material, or other harmful or destructive
force or substance, or by any other means, causes a
wide-spread injury or damage to persons or property
is guilty of causing a catastrophe.
(2) Causing a catastrophe is a felony of the second
degree if the person causes it knowingly and a class A
misdemeanor if caused recklessly.
WTA
76-6-106. Criminal mischief.
< 1 > A person commits criminal mischief if:
(a) Under circumstances not amounting to
arson, he damages or destroys property with the
intention of defrauding an insurer: or
(b) He intentionally and unlawfully tampers
with the property of another and thereby:
(i) Recklessly endangers human life; or
(ii) Recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of anypublic utility service; or
(c) He intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another.
(d) He recklessly or willfully shoots or propels
a missile or other object at or against a motor
vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, locomotive, train
railway car or caboose, whether moving or stand
ing.
(2) (a) A violation of Section 76-6-106(l)(a) is a fel
ony of the third degree.
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